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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

FRANZ B. SCHICK and MARYEVE
S. SCHICK, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
RAYMOND J. ASHTON, RAYMOND
L. EVANS AND B. EUGENE BRAZIER, a partnership, doing business
as ASHTON, EVANS & BRAZIER,
Architects and Engineers.

Case No. 8651

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, appellants in this court, commenced the
action in the court below by a complaint in which they
sought to recover from the defendants, respondents in
this court, as architects, for allegedly negligently and carelessly designing and providing specifications for a heating
system to be installed in a home constructed for plaintiffs
in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R 1) Defendant denied the
1
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plaintiff's allegations and counterclaimed for the balance
of their architectural fee. (R 3-5) The case was tried to
a jury. The jury returned a verdict of "no cause of action"
on the plaintiffs' complaint, and awarded damages to the
defendants on their counterclaim against plaintiffs in the
amount of $400.00. (R 58-59) Plaintiffs and appellants
prosecute this appeal from the judgment of the court
entered in accordance with the verdict, (R 68), and from
the order of the court denying plaintiffs' motion for New
trial. ( R 68)
Hereinafter the parties will be referred to in this
brief as they respectively appear in this court "appellants"
and "respondents".
Respondents are not in agreement with the statement
of facts as set forth in the brief of the appellants. The
Statement of Facts as set forth in the appellants' brief
is an argumentive summary of portions of the testimony
and evidence before the jury in the court below. To make
a detailed analysis of the controverted factual statements
set forth in appellants' brief would appear to serve no
useful purpose herein, but in compliance with rule 75
(P) (2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we do point out
by way of example one or two of the discrepancies noted
in the appellants' statement of facts.
At Page 2 of appellants brief are set forth supposed
admission of fact by respondents as follows:
"They admit that they agreed to and did prepare specifications and working drawings to meet
2
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local climatic conditions, and that they obtained
bids for the construction of the home and let contracts for the same and agreed to and did supervise the construction to completion. (R 1, 3-4)"
When the text of the actual admissions as set forth
in respondents' answer is examined, it is found that the
defendants admitted to having,
"On or about April 1, 1952, in consideration of
an agreed fee of 6% of the total construction cost to
plaintiffs, to be paid by plaintiffs to defendants, entered into an oral contract whereby defendants agreed to perform certain professional services for
plaintiffs pertaining to construction of a house for
plaintiffs at 2173 Pheasant Way, Holladay, Salt
Lake County, Utah; allege that said home was originally designed by Richard J. Neutra, an architect of
Los Angeles, California, and at the special instance
and request of plaintiffs, defendants modified said
design to meet local climatic conditions, to meet specific requirements of plaintiffs including the cooling
cycle for air conditioning; defendants further agreed to and did prepare specifications and working
drawings based upon said design as modified in the
particulars as above set forth; defendants agreed to
and did obtain bids for the construction of said
home in accordance with said modified design, but
plaintiffs refused to accept any of the bids so obtained and on plaintiff's own initiative and independent of defendants obtained a general contractor and heating subcontractor by direct negotiation,
and plaintiffs did let said contracts upon conditions
at variance with the contract documents as prepared
3
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by defendants, all for the purpose of meeting plaintiffs' requirements for reduction of construction
costs and for other matters of personal preference;
defendants agreed to and did supervise said construction to completion based upon the contract as
let by plaintiffs, but plaintiffs entered into certain
verbal agreements with said contractors agreeing
upon changes in requirements under the construction documents, all without the knowledge or approval of defendants" (R 3-4). (Italics ours)
As a further example of the misleading character of
the appellants' statement of facts is the statement appearing at Page 7 of appellants' brief wherein without any
reference to the parts of the record supporting the statement, appellants say,
"Defendants never made a full and adequate
balance and test of the completed system as they
had admittedly undertaken to do as a specific term
of the oral contract, but certain tests were made by
the defendants in connection with the adequacy of
the air delivery system."
The testimony on this point by Mr. Brazier, one of the
defendants and respondents, is as follows:
And as a result of the test or tests which
you made did you come to any conclusion as to its
adequacy for heating the house?
A. After, I believe that it was the second test that
I witnessed and recorded with Mr. Olsen and taking
into consideration all of the previous corrections
that we made to the system and taking the result
of that test:.and the previous test, I came to the
conclusion that it was satisfactory." (R 552)
"Q.
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Because of the inaccuracies noted in the appellants'
statements of facts, respondents choose to make their own
statment of facts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dr. Franz B. Schick and Maryeve S. Schick, plaintiffs
and appellants herein are husband and wife. (R 1) Defendants and respondents herein are architects and engineers licensed to practice in the State of Utah. (R 1 & 3)
Appellants employed one Richard J. Neutra of Los Angeles,
California, a noted architect and designer of residences to
draw plans and specifications for the construction of a
residence for the appellants, said residence to be located
at 2173 Pheasant Way in Holladay, Salt Lake County,
Utah. (R 336) A contract was duly made and entered into
with Mr. Neutra by appellants. (R 336 and R 600 Ex 36)
Mr. Neutra became ill and was unable to complete his
assignment, or so he apparently advised Dr. Schick. (R 95
and 347) Appellants having been previously acquainted
with B. Eugene Brazier, one of the respondents, prevailed
upon him to undertake the assignment of taking over the
design of Mr. Neutra and completing the necessary plans,
making such adaptations as were necessary for local conditions and to supervise the construction of the residence
basing their design on Neutra's plans, including an airfloor heating system originally proposed to N eutra and
acceptable to appellants. (R 93 and 96) Respondents prepared plans and specifications for the construction of the
residence of appellants. (R 83 and

~75)

The plans and

5
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specifications were let out to contractors by respondents
for bid and bids were returned for the construction of
the residence in accordance with the plans and specifications, but the bids were higher than expected and the appellants rejected all the bids. (R 104-5, 375) Respondent
Brazier offered to re-design the residence, eliminating some
of the features and to obtain new bids on the re-designed
structure. (R 548) Appellants rejected this suggestion.
(R 548) Appellants, acting on a suggestion by Brazier,
undertook to find some less well known contractors to see
if a lower bid could be obtained. (R 377) By eliminating
some features such as the cooling cycle in the air conditioning system, and by substituting hot air furnaces for
the heating equipment designed by the respondents, and
by making other changes and substitutions in the plan in
general, appellants succeeded in getting bids from Nelson,
Pierce and Hogenson, general contractors, for the construction of the residence and from Modern Aire for the
installation of a modified heating system. (R 378-9) The
heating system as designed by respondents was never actually constructed and put into operation. ( R 224 and 446,
477) The modifications in the heating system desired by
Dr. Schick for the purpose of decreasing the cost were
discussed by Dr. Schick with Mr. Brazier who explained
that while the modified systein would probably heat
the premises satisfactorily, performance comparable with
that of the designed system could not be expected. (R 108)
The residence was constructed incorporating the modified
heating system for which Dr. Schick had obtained bids.
6
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The respondents supervised the construction of the residence and saw that all of the construction was performed
in accordance with the contract meticulously well and particularly with respect to the heating system. (R 110) Tests
performed by respondents and by experts employed by
Dr. Schick disclosed that certain restrictions existed in
the underfloor return air system of the installation and
corrective measures were taken which, according to the
tests conducted subsequent to making the correction, eliminated the deficiency. (R 442-513) The cause of the deficiency was unknown, but resulted from some restriction,
the exact nature of which could not be determined. (R 442)
The difficulty did not result from design. (R 442) Despite
the results of tests by both engineers employed by Schick
and by respondents, which reflected the adequacy of the
system to heat the home, Dr. Schick and his wife remained
dissatisfied with the heating system (R 514-390) and
brought suit claiming respondents negligently designed the
heating system so that when constructed the same was inadequate. (R 1) Such additional facts as may be necessary
to the complete development of the case will be set forth
in the argument.

POINTS RELIED UPON
The Statement of Points upon which appellants rely
as set forth in appellants' brief will be followed by respondents in answering the contentions of the appellants. However, in the interest of space the points of appellants will
be more briefly stated and the converse of the appellants'
7
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point is, of course, relied upon by the respondents. Thus
stated, the points upon which respondents rely are as
follows:
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF RESPONDENT'S LIABILITY.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY IN ANY MANNER
WHICH ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE APPELLANTS.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 1, 2, 3,
4, 6, 8 AND 10, NOR IN MODIFYING INSTRUCTIONS
5, 9, 12-A.
POINT IV.
THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT ADVERSELY
AFFECTED BY ANY INCONSISTENCY IN THE TRIAL
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 6 AND 10.
POINT V.
THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
ARGUMENT
It is noted that appellants did not comply in setting
forth the Argument in their brief with Rule 75 (P) (2)
( 4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides, "the
argument, under separate subdivisions at the beginning
of each of which appears in full the point or points dis8
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cussed therein." Rather appellants chose to set forth entirely new headings for the argument. We interpret the
brief of appellants that their first heading in the Argument covers Point 1 of their statement of points; heading
No. 2, covers points 2 through 4; and heading No. 3,
covers point No. 6. We do not find that points 5 or 7 are
argued in the appellants' brief and we, therefore, assume
that the same were abandoned. Our Argument for convenience, in so far as may be feasible, will be similarly
grouped. We conform to the rule as stated and set forth
our argument under the point or points to which it relates, rather than under the headings of appellants.
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF RESPONDENT'S LIABILITY.
Without citing any authority in support thereof, appellants have, throughout the trial and in their discussion under Point I of their Argument, contended that
respondents are liable in damages to appellants if the appellants were not satisfied with the heating systems in
the house for which appellants engaged the respondents as
architects to draw plans and supervise the construction.
The appellants' position ignores both the facts and the
law. We shall deal first with the facts.
Appellants did not engage respondents to act as architects and engineers in connection with the residential construction in the first instance. They first engaged Richard
9
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J. Neutra. (R 336) Only upon Neutra's inability to complete the commission did they turn to the respondents and
the relationship which was then formulated was very
informal and consisted solely of a verbal agreement (R
91) Basically the terms of the verbal agreement as outlined by Mr. Brazier, one of the respondents, were that the
respondents were required to prepare all necessary working drawings, adhering to the design of Richard Neutra,
with adaptations requested by the owner; take bids and
prepare contracts between owner and contractor; approve
shop drawings; supervise construction with regard to the
conformity with all contractual documents; prepare details required for interpretation of construction plans;
with regard to the heating and air conditioning system,
the basic design incorporated by Richard N eutra was accepted by the owner and concurred in by the respondents
and the respondents were required to establish by accepted
engineering principles the size and type of the units necessary to the operation of the system, and of the duct runs
and registers and upon completion of construction, to balance and check the performance for maximum efficiency.
For this service, the respondents were to receive a fee of
6% of the total construction cost. ( R 92, 93) The heating
system chosen by Neutra and concurred in by Dr. Schick
and his wife was known as an Airfloor System. ( R 600 Ex.
39, 52) Mr. Brazier testified that the Airfloor design and
plan was furnished to him with the plans from Neutra,
all of which were turned over to him by Dr. Schick. (R
100) The plan referred to was introduced as Exhibit 19.
10
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(R 600 Ex. 19, R 100) Dr. Schick attempted to testify
that he had never heard of the Airfloor System and was
"scared to death" of it, but on closer examination had to
admit that Mr. Brazier had told him that he was not
familiar with the systen1 and accordingly Dr. Schick, who
had been corresponding with the Airfloor people and had
in turn had them correspond with Neutra, (R 600 Ex. 39)
arranged a meeting between Mr. Brazier and Mr. Leemhuis
of Airfloor Company because he wanted Mr. Brazier to
become familiar with the system. ( R 368) The contradictory, and evasive character of the testimony of Dr. Schick
is noteworthy on this particular point. Commencing at
page 366 of the Record appears the following exchange,
"Q. Now, Dr. Schick, you were very impressed
with the idea of an airfloor furnace, weren't you,
with the airfloor system"? (At witnesses request
the question was repeated). A. "Not at all. I was
scared to death. I had never heard of it before."
Q. "Do I understand it is your testimony that you
were forced to accept this then by someone?" "A.
I wouldn't put it in these words but I told Mr.
Brazier that, 'Here is a local firm, Gritton and
Wilde, who had a specific proposal, very specific.' I
sent to Mr. Brazier the representative of Walter
Lloyd Company, a most honorable and best known
firm that proposed also a different system. I had
Mr. Brazier look at the Federal Oil Company, another system and I said to Mr. Brazier, 'Listen, I
have never in my life before heard of that airfloor system. Don't you want to consider something
else?' And he rejected it all. He said, 'You leave it
up to me. This will take, I guarantee.' That is the
truth."

11
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Q. "So that you did all of the investigation
on the systems, not only the airfloor system, but
all the others, didn't you, Dr. Schick?"

A. "I didn't do any investigation. I told Mr.
Brazier Mr. Neutra's original advice to get the
Gritton and Wilde, the second one in all. I am a
Professor and I tried to cooperate honestly when I
was asked originally by Mr. Neutra to give him
a few firms, the names of reputable firms that
have different systems, so I did. And that is what
Mr. Brazier took over. There was no specific system and logically, all I can do is, I am a simple logical professor of philosophy. I can think logically.
I am not technical and when something comes to me
of which I have never heard before, which was entirely new, of course, I was a little doubtful and I
said to Brazier, 'Won't you consider a few other
things?' But he rejected them all and always came
back with the answer, 'This is my responsibility.'
You have got to trust me.' You read it in the letter.
'You have got to trust me.'"
Q. "Then how did it happen that Mr. Neutra
in his correspondence, which has been introduced,
is talking about the airfloor forms?"

A. "This is one of the many suggestions which
he received."
Q. "And do you recall a man by the name of
Leenhuis ?"

A. "That is the owner of the Airfloor Company of California."
Q.

"And do you recall inviting Mr. Leenhuis

to come here and see you and meet Mr. Brazier?"
A. "Yes sir. Because I was scared to death
and I thought it would be a good idea to have at

12
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least the owner of that firm to come to Mr. Brazier
and explain what that system was all about, because
he told me he had never heard of it."
Q. "So you invited Mr. Leenhuis to come heY.e
and you did introduce him to Mr. Brazier?"

A.

"That's right."

Respondents acquitted their responsibility to design
the system and to prepare plans thereof and the plans
which they drew were introduced into evidence. (R 601)
However, the system as designed by the respondents was
never built. (R 224, 446-7, 477) Due to the fact that the
cost of building the proposed residence exceeded the amount
which Schicks desired to spend, the bids received from
contractors were all rejected. (R 104, 375) The offer of
Mr. Brazier to re-design the house was refused by Dr.
Schick. ( R 548) Schick undertook personally to find a
contractor and subcontractors, particularly the heating subcontractor and to get the house built for what he could
pay. (R 378) He was not able to do so, however, and retain all of the features of the plan as designed by respondents. (R 378-384) He was compelled to delete many features from the heating system as designed by respondents.
As a money-saving measure the cooling cycle was eliminated. (R 383) The heating source was changed from that
designed by respondents to two hot air furnaces. (R 383)
The fans were changed from the type designed by respondents to simply make use of the fans incorporated in the
hot air furnaces. (R 156, 157 and 166) The concrete under
the airfloor forms was eliminated to save cost. (R 549)

13
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Instead of a vertical discharge register in front of the big
windows in the living room, as designed and specified by
respondents, another type of register discharging into the
room was installed. (R 171, 172) Not one witness ever
tied the system as installed to the respondents. It was admitted that the designed system was good. (R 224, 600 Ex.
56 Letter Dated April 11, 1955) At all times during construction and thereafter Schicks were employing other
experts to check on respondents' work in the matter of the
heating system. (R 450-1) They never at any time relied
on Ashton, Evans and Brazier for counsel on the heating
system. They employed, during and after construction, the
following engineers and architects to check on the work
of respondents, Stephen MacDonald, architect, (R 272)
Professor William S. Olsen, (R 273) Gerald E. Wright,
Jr., consulting engineer, (R 274) Mr. Gollaher, engineer,
(R 406, 600 Ex. 56) Mr. Howard J. Hassell, engineer (R
119). Of all of these persons employed, the appellants called
only one as a witness, Howard J. Hassell. (R 117) Respondents called William S. Olsen as their witness. (R
420) Mr. Hassell, the engineer relied upon by appellants
to prove that the system designed by respondents was defective, admitted that the system as installed was not
the system as designed by respondents. (R 158-165) He
stated he never saw a plan drawn by respondents calling
for installation of hot air furnaces as actually installed.
( R 224) He testified that he found only one possible defect in the design and that was a restriction in the cold
air return around the fireplace. (R 179) Mr. Hassell ad14
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mitted that if, instead of being installed as drawn, an
additional tier of airfloor forms were added in the cold
air return system in that area the return air would be
increased by 20%. ( R 577-8) The contractor who installed the air floor forms, Milo Cazier of Modern Aire,
testified that an additional tier of airfloor forms was installed at the point of the supposed restriction. (R 480)
The testimony of this Milo Cazier was never re-butted in
any way.
As to the actual installation, it was the conclusion
of all of the witnesses that testified, save and except Mr.
Hassell who testified for the appellants, that the system
as installed was adequate. (R 441, 514, 485) Reports of
the engineers were introduced into evidence, air volumes
were shown, but Mr. Hassell, the only one who did not
find the installed system would deliver sufficient air, was
unable to state why the system did not deliver sufficient
air and when questioned closely on certain of the details
of his test he was unable to explain certain discrepancies
in his report. He stated in his report that the load placed
upon the motors in the hot air furnace blower units resulted from the attempt of the fans to suck air. (R 199)
Yet, when examined on the characteristics of these fans
in operation, he had to admit that the fans did not derive
their load from sucking air, but from delivering air. (R
202) The examination of Mr. Hassell in this connection
is most enlightening for while he admitted all of the facts
which impeached the statement in his report, he refused
to admit that the report was in error. (R 202-3)
15
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The primary complaint of the appellants was that
they were cold and the windows frosted in the winter. (R
260) Yet not one person other than appellants themselves
ever testified that the house was cold. The record is replete with engineering computations on air delivery, supply,
return, etc., but not even the engineers said the house was
cold or that it couldn't be heated with the equipment installed. No one ever found fault with the work which was
done in making the installation. Mr. Hassell indicated
he believed insulation should have been installed around
the perimeter of the air floor forms. (R 175) The contractor who installed the insulation testified to its installation and demonstrated to the jury from photographs intraduced in evidence taken by Dr. Schick that it was installed and visible during construction. (R 478-479) The
Schicks insisted on the installation of time clocks to provide
a night shutback in operating the system against the advice of all persons concerned. ( R 485-6-7) l\Ir. Hassell,
Schicks' engineer recognized that this type of system required continuous operation to provide heat. (R 181-182)
Schicks claimed they did not use the clocks and that the
house was cold though the furnaces ran all of the time
(R 288 & 390) Mr. Ted R. Brown, expert on heating employed by Ashton, Evans and Brazier, made a
computation from the fuel bills introduced in evidence
by appellants, (R 600, Ex. 50), using accepted mathematical and engineering principles which proved that the
furnaces, or "heat exchangers" as Mr. Brown called them,
were actually in operation in the Schick residence only

16
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twenty-two and one half per cent of the time during the
heating season defined as from October 1st through May
30th. (R 521) Mr. Brown testified that from tests made
personally on the system installed he found the system adequate vvith the changes incorporated during the tests and
during construction to heat the house. (R 514) Mr. Brazier
testified to the same effect. (R 552) Mr. Olson, an engineer
employed by Schicks, testified as to the recommendations he
had made during construction and stated that if his recommendations were carried out, the system would be satisfactory. (R 429) By other witnesses it was proved, namely
Mr. Brown, Mr. Cazier and Mr. Brazier, that Mr. Olson's
recommendations were adopted and carried out. (R 482,
512, 523, 514, 552) The facts may then be summarized that
the respondents were never the designers of the heating
system as actually installed. The system which was contracted for by Schick was installed meticulously well. (R
110) The system as installed was adequate to heat the
house. (R 514)
In view of all of the facts since appellants did not
buy the heating system designed by respondents, are the
respondents nevertheless responsible in damages for the
fact that Dr. Schick and his wife subjectively state that
they were cold and that the heating system designed by defendants was defective? We believe that the appellants
wholly and completely failed to show any fault on the part
of the repondents which gave rise to the complaint of appellants, or to establish any basis for asserting liability against
respondents.
17
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The law is clear that an architect in performing his
duties is not held to a standard of perfection. In a recent
annotation on the subject of an Architects Liability appearing in 25 ALR 2d at page 1085, the annotating authority
at page 1086 says,
"By his contract, the architect implies that he'
possesses the necessary competence and ability, including taste, to enable him to furnish plans and
specifications prepared with a reasonable degree
of technical skill, and such as would produce, if
followed and adhered to, a building of the kind
called for, without marked defects in character,
strength or appearance. This skill and ability which
he is bound to exercise are such as are ordinarily
required of architects, which is a higher degree than
that required of unskilled persons. In testing the
architect's competence, h o w e v e r, consideration
should be given only to the knowledge that was
available to his profession at the time he was employed. The architect's undertaking in the absence

of a special agreement, does not imply or guarantee a perfect plan or a satisfactory result." (Italics
ours)
In the case of White vs. Pallay, 119 Oregon 97, 247
P. 316, the court was confronted with a case in which the
plaintiff sought to recover for his services as architect
in the preparation of sketches, drawings, plans, details
and specifications for the erection of a building in Portland and in superintending the erection thereof. Defendant
contended that the plans were defective in regard to the
foundation, and in fact the evidence showed that during
construction the building settled and remedial steps had to
be taken which cost the defendant about $1700. The theory
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of the defendant was that he contracted for plans and
specifications which when carried out would produce a
certain agreed result. In substance, his position was that
t1e plaintiff (architects) warranted that the plans and
specifications would produce that result, and because they
failed and required amendment, and betterment of the
foundation became necessary that the plaintiff must respond in damages. The court quotes the rule above quoted
from the annotating authority with approval citing 5
Corpus Juris 269. The court continued,
"It is out of place at this juncture to review the
testimony and quote therefrom. The trier of the fact
the judge before whom the case was heard without
a jury, has determined the facts by his findings,
and although, there may be room for dispute in the
declaration of the witnesses, we can only say that
there is evidence supporting the conclusions reached
by the judge who heard the case.
"There is nothing in the record indicating that
the plaintiff gave any warranty as to the results
of his plans and specifications. Warranties must be
complied with strictly, and must be true as stated
at all hazards. (citing cases) The precedents cited
by defendant treat the question of the liability of
the architect as one of fact, and hold that he must
act with reasonable diligence in the performance
of his duties. The great weight of authority is that
this is the measure of the duty of the architect.
In the instant case, the question is about whether
the foundation of the building was sufficient, considering the nature of the ground upon which it
was erected, and there is testimony from which the
trier of the fact could determine that the plaintiff
exercised reasonable care and diligence in the exam-
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ination of the site and in the preparation of the
plans and specifications. This being true in point
of fact as found beyond our power to gainsay, the
plaintiff performed his full duty and is not liable in
damages."
In the case of Palmer v. Brown, 127 California App.
2d 44, 273 P. 2d 306, while the facts involved many other
facets of the architect's responsibility one of the points
raised before the court was the acquittal of the architect's
duty in a supervisory capacity and the California court
held that the manner in which the duties were acquitted
by the architect were issues of fact and should be submited
to the jury and said,
"While concededly the architects undertaking,
absent a special agreement, is not an absolute guaranty that satisfactory results will ensue, see White
v. Pallay, 119 Or. 97, 247 P. 316, Shipman v. State
43 Wis. 381; Chapel v. Clark 117 Mich. 638, 76 NW
62; there is evidence that the above defects might
have been caused not merely by deficiencies in the
materials used, but by plaintiff's failure to exercise
reasonable care and diligence ·in the supervision
of the work. Under the circumstances here present,
these were issues of fact which should have gone
to the jury."
As to the effect of the owners dealing direct with the
contractor independently of the architect we cite the case
of Gaastra v. Holmes 36 New Mexico 175, 10 P 2d 589.
In this case the architects sued for compensation for services performed. The difference in the case resulted from
defects in construction which the owner considered the
fault of the architects, and for which the latter refused to
20
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admit liability. It appeared that the owner had himself
let a number of the contracts and that the architect supervised the construction under the contracts as let by the
owners, and the court held : "Where the owner has an
independent relation to the contractor, the architect, of
course, does not warrant the construction."
In the instant case an attempt was made out by appellants to claim a special agreement because of the fact
thc1t Mr. Brazier knew of the sensitivities of Dr. Schick
in regard to heating systems. But no one, not even Dr.
Schick, ever testified that respondents contracted to meet
his personal requirements. The only testimony ever offered
was that respondents were to design an "adequate system."
We submit that the facts more than bear out respondents
performed this duty. The issues in regard thereto were
correctly submitted to the jury and by the jury found in
favor of the respondents. No error is shown by appellants
necessitating a reversal of this verdict.
A word may be said about the manner in which the
argument of the appellants repetitively ignors a most important fact. Throughout their argument on all points the
appellants refer to the agreement of the respondents, "to
design and install an adequate heating and cooling system." The conjunctive "and" used by the appellants gives
the impression that the act to be performed was a single
act. In fact the appellants did design an excellent system,
and as we have elsewhere pointed out with multiple reference to the record, no one attacked the basic soundness of
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the system designed by the respondents. However, the system as designed was never installed. This fact the appellants continuously ignore. No effort was made and no
proof was ever offered to show that the respondents Y:e~:e
the authors or designers of the system which was actually incorporated into the Schick residence. The appellants
seem to rely on a theory that because the respondents did
not prevent the appellants by some means, from installing
the inferior system, that they should be held responsible
for any dissatisfaction with the inferior system installed.
And this in the face of the testimony by Dr. and Mrs.
Schick that they employed expert after expert for advice
on the heating system they installed. Dr. Schick would not
buy the system that appellants designed because it cost
more than he wanted to spend. Because he bought a cheaper
system is the designer of the original system responsible?
We submit that the position of the appellants is untenable.
Respondents response to the Argument of the appellants set forth in their brief under the first heading in the
Argument would not be complete without a brief comment
on the cases cited by appellant. A review of the cases cited
reflects that not one is in point or in any way stands for
the principle for which it is apparently cited by the appellant. The case of Adams Radiawr & Boiler Works Ltd.,
vs. Schnader, 26 Atl. 745, is a case involving a written
contract for the installation of a steam heating apparatus
manufactured by Adams Radiator in premises belonging
to one Schnader. The contract, which was in essence a
22
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sales contract, carried an express warranty in these words,
"We guaranty this apparatus for heating by steam to be
constructed in a good, thorough and workmanlike manner,
to give entire satisfaction in its operation and to work
entirely noiselessly. Should it prove unsatisfactory after a
thorough and reasonable trial, we will remove it, * * *"
The dissimilarity of the two cases, the one at bar and the
cited case, and the inapplicability of the law of express
warranty under a sales contract to the case before this
court is so manifest we believe we need do no more than
to point out to this court the nature of the cited case.

Gerish v. Herold, (N. J.) 83 A. 898, is a case in which
the court was required to interpret the effect on an owner
who was suing on a building contract, of an architects ruling as to the sufficiency of materials and construction.
The court held that in that case where a specific
written contract was involved, the architect's decision and
certificates of completion issued in accordance therewith
was not binding on the owner in an action against the
builder. The applicability of any of the rulings of the court
in that case to any of the circumstances in the instant case
is not apparent from an examination of the facts in the
two cases.
Barnett v. Beggs (8th Cir.) 208 F. 255, is a case involving the interpretation of a written contract between
owner and architect which contract contained a clause
requiring the plans and specifications to be prepared by
the architect to "the satisfaction of the owner." The court
23
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held that where a contract for architects services required
plans and specifications satisfactory to the owner, the
architects were bound to furnish plans satisfactory to the
owner and not merely such as ought to have been satisfactory. Again the inapplicability of the cited case to the
case at bar is manifest. In the instant case there is not
one single item of evidence or testimony which indicated
that the plans and specifications were to be to the satisfaction of the owner. Appellants, in their argument, admit
that the most that could have ever been required would
be an "adequate" heating system. Certainly in the absence
of some express agreement the standards of adequacy are
not the subjective tests applied by Dr. and Mrs. Schick.
Morgan v. Gamble, Pa. 79 A. 410 is again a case in-

volving a building contract and the liability of the contractor to meet the requirements of the owner where the
contract in writing expressly provided that the contractor should furnish all materials and perform all work to the
satisfaction of the owner. In this case the holding of the
court is in direct conflict with the claim of the appellants
herein that the issue is not one for the jury under such
circumstances but is a matter of law. The court held:
"We have uniformly upheld such contracts and
required their observance. Under a contract of that
character it is the duty of the contractor to perform to the satisfaction of the owner, and that is the
standard by which the sufficiency of the work is
to be tested. It is not for the court or the jury to
determine whether the work is being done in com24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pliance therewith, but solely for the owner to determine, and with his decision the contractor must
comply. Of course, the dissatisfaction of the owner
which will defeat a recovery by the contractor must
be real and genuine, and not one prompted by caprice or bad faith, or for the purpose of evading the
balance due the contractor. If the objections made
by the owner are bona fide, and not unreasonable
or capricious, they must be sustained. The question
is generally for the jury; but the evidence 'iJ'LaY be
such as to require the court to withdraw the case
from the jury." (Italics ours)
In the instant case, not only was there no such contract provision, verbal or written, as in the cited case, but
we submit that an examination of the facts discloses that
in the instant case the dissatisfaction of the owner, if any
legitimate dissatisfaction existed, resulted entirely from
his failure to buy the heating system designed by the respondents and his substitution of the cheaper equipment.
Under the facts in the instant case, we again reiterate
that the case was very properly submitted to the jury
and the jury has ruled thereon.
The applicability of the Nagle v. City of Billings case,
250 P. 445, to the case at bar escapes us completely. In
that case the problem involved was the instructions given
to a jury as to the liability of a city for inspection of its
sidewalks to prevent injury to persons using the walk. The
court found that the instruction given made the city an
insurer of the safety of the persons using the walk, said
25
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this was not the law and overruled the lower court.
We submit that a review of the cases cited by the
appellants does not disclose anything which points up any
error in the proceedings by the lower court in the instant
case in either fact or law.

POINTS II, III, IV
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY IN ANY MANNER
WHICH ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE APPELLANTS.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 1, 2, 3,
4, 6, 8 AND 10, NOR IN MODIFYING INSTRUCTIONS
5, 9, 12-A.
POINT IV.
THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT ADVERSELY
AFFECTED BY ANY INCONSISTENCY IN THE TRIAL
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 6 AND 10.
Since all of these points deal substantially with the
same matter, the effect of the court's instructions on the
action of the jury we shall present respondent's position on
all three points as a consolidated argument.
Appellants, at page 15 and 16 of their brief, complain of the court's instruction No. 5. It is claimed by the
appellants that the instruction ignores the express contract between the parties whereby they assert respondents
"agreed to install an adequate heating and cooling system,
and, in terms of performance, represented that it would
function properly". It is noteworthy that appellants make
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no reference to the record to substantiate this statement.
The reason is obvious because there is not one word in the
record that respondents ever at any time in any manner
"agreed to install an adequate heating and cooling system." The respondents agreed to design an adequate heating system. ( R 93-4) and this they did. ( R 224-5, 600 Ex.
56 Letter dated April 11, 1955) They agreed to supervise
the construction and this they did. (R 110, 369-70) We have
rather exhaustively reviewed the evidence on this matter
under point I of this brief and we do not wish to belabor
the court again on the same matter, but the basis of the
appellants' complaint against instruction 5 in so far as
the facts are concerned cannot be substantiated from the
record.
Furthermore, the instruction correctly states the law.
We refer this court to an annotation covering the subject
appearing in 25 ALR 2d at page 1093 wherein the annotating authority cites several cases holding that an architect's undertaking to prepare plans did not imply or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory result. We also again
refer to the case of White v. Pallay, the Oregon case previously cited 119 Or. 97, 247 P. 316 similarly holding.
Appellants further complain of alleged inconsistency
between instructions 6, 10 and 11 given by the court.
Instruction 6 reads in accordance with established law
down to the phrase added to the instruction by the court
in favor of appellants as follows, "and in determining
the degree of care, skill and ability to be used by the archi27
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tects, consideration may be given to the awareness by the
architects of prior difficulties had by the Schicks with
heating systems and the special sensitivities possessed by
the Schicks." The instruction is in conformity wiC1 the lr.'v
as set out by the cases cited in the annotation referred
to at 25 ALR 2d 1087 except for the last phase of the instruction above quoted. This portion of the instruction
is not the law and was objected to by the respondents at
the time of trial. However, an examination of the language
employed clearly reflects that the only party that could
suffer injury as a result of the error were the respondents. The architects, respondents herein, are held to a
measure of performance never contemplated by law. The
mere fact of awareness of the Schick sensibilities in regard
to a heating system imposes absolutely no liability on the
architects to meet the same in the absence of an express
contract imposing upon them a duty to meet this sensitivity, yet the instruction would permit the jury to take into
consideration the sensitivity of the Schicks in connection
with the determination of the standard of care which the
architects were held to in their performance. Despite this
instruction, the facts were so manifestly clear that there
was no cause of action against the respondents the jury
correctly returned a verdict on plaintiffs' complaint of
"no cause of action".
Instructions 10 and 11 complained of by the appellants have no bearing on the action actually taken by the
jury. These two instructions set out a measure of damages.
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The language in instruction 10 is, we believe, reasonably
clear and understandable by persons conversant with the
English language. It is not required nor desired that a
court attempt to interpret every word in an instruction.
To do so would make instructions to the jury interminable
in length and vastly confusing. A court is entitled to assume
that the jury is composed of persons of a normal degree
of understanding and if the instruction is so wordled as to
be understandable to a person possessed of a normal degree of understanding then it should be satisfactory as to
clarity. We believe instruction 10 meets this standard, but
even assuming that it did not do so the appellants are
in no position to complain of the matter at this time. In
making their objection to instruction 10, the appellants
made no reference to any ambiguity in the terms of the
instruction nor to any fault in its wording. Their objection was limited to the fact that they considered it inconsistent with the evidence and an incorrect statement of the
law of damages. ( R 595) Furthermore, the instruction
certainly had no bearing on the fact that the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. Had the jury returned a verdict in which there was some question as to
the amount of damages allowed the appellants, perhaps an
argument might be made on the matter, but where the
jury finds that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, the
fact that the court instructed as to the measure of damages
in language to which appellant objects would certainly be
no basis for reversing the action of the jury in finding
that no cause of action existed.

29
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As to instruction No. 11, we cannot but note that this
instruction is one requested by the appellants themselves.
That it is inconsistent with the other instructions is manifest. Appellants admit in their brief at page 10 e1at the
respondents recognized this as a contract action. Unfortunately, the appellants did not recognize what kind of an
action was before the court. They insisted upon recovery
for items of claimed damage which generally in the absence
of special circumstances never proved in this case, have
no place in an action on contract, towit pain and suffering, mental anguish, etc. (R 328, and instruction 11, R 29)
The law is well established that these classifications of damage are not generally recoverable in a contract action. The
applicable law of damages in a contract action requires that
the claimed damage must reasonably be within the contemplation of the parties. We cannot find that the Supreme
Court of Utah has ruled on whether mental anguish and suffering, etc. are recoverable in a contract action such as the
case at bar. However, a good statement of the general
rule is found in Volume 15 Am. Jur., "DAMAGES", Page
599, Sec. 182 -

Breach of Contract. -

"Damages for mental anguish are not as a
general rule, recoverable in actions for breach of
contract unless the breach amounts in substance
to a wilful or independent tort. According to the
weight of authority, mental anguish is not considered an element of recovery in an action for violation of an ordinary contract, as for example, one
for the payment of money. Recovery therefore has
been denied in a number of cases where such men-
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tal anguish and suffering were the only damages
or where they are not accompanied by physical
injury. In some states, however, mental anguish
or suffering is a proper element of damage in actions for breach of contract, at least where it may
be said that such anguish is the natural result of
the breach or where it may reasonably be held
to have been within the contemplation of the parties
at the time of entering into the contract as a probable result of its bre.ach. * * *" (Italics ours)
In the case before this court it could certainly never
be said that it was within the contemplation of the parties
to the contract at the time that respondents agreed to perform service as architects for appellants as has been heretofore set forth in some detail, that the mental anguish
and pain and suffering appellants claim they suffered because they claim the house was cold and the bills for fuel
and electricity appellants were required to pay for operation of the heating system were possible elements of damage in the event of a breach of the contract by the respondents.
However, we again wish to emphasize the fact that the
error in the instruction is not a basis for the reversal of
the action of the lower court because it related solely to
the question of damages. The jury did not demonstrate any
uncertainty on the question of damages. It simply found
that the plaintiff - appellants herein, had no cause of
action. In view of these facts, we submit that the error
in the instructions, which in any event was only damaging
to the respondents, not the appellants, constitutes no ground
for reversal.
31
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With respect to the objection stated at page 16 of
appellants' brief to instruction 9, at the trial the appellants raised no objection to instruction No. 9. It is in fact
simply the requested instruction of the appellants No. 5
with a small deletion and an addition by the court, but
states the law just as the appellants contended for the law.
(R 18) That the instruction is erroneous is true, and it
was objected to by the respondents at the trial, but again
the error militates in favor of the appellants, not against
them, and consequently the appellants cannot be heard
to complain of its affect upon the jury. Certainly, it would
be a bizarre and inequitable thing if a party to an action
can request an erroneous instruction and then use his own
error as a basis for reversal of the decision by the court
below.
Since the appellants do not argue the matter of the
failure of the court to give their requested instructions
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 10, except as the same may be involved in the argument on the alleged error in the court's
instructions which we have answered as above, we will
make no specific argument on this point, but "·e do direct
this court's attention to the instructions which were refused, and we submit that the refusal to give the requested
instructions was justified inasmuch as they are not in
'harmony with either the law, or the evidence which was
then before the court.
In this regard American Jurisprudence on Appeal and
Error, Volume 3, Page 334, Section 773, states,
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"The general rule that the appellants' brief
must be so prepared that all questions presented by
the assignment of errors can be determined by an
examination of the briefs and question not so presented are deemed waived, applies to errors in the
giving or refusing of instructions."
That this is the rule in this court is established by the
case of Felkner v. Smith, decided by this court March 12,
1931, 77 Utah 410, 296 P. 776. In that case the court said
of a contention with regard to timely presentation of a
negotiable instrument set up in the assignment of errors
but not argued to the court, "That assignment of error
is not argued in appellants' brief, and therefore is deemed
waived."
We wish to consider briefly the cases cited by appellants in their brief in support of the argument that the
mere fact of inconsistency in the instructions to the jury
is sufficient grounds to justify a reversal.

State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P. 2d 647 is a criminal
case. The defendant was accused of indecent assault of a
twelve year old female child. The trial judge instructed
the jury that,
"It is not necessary for the State to prove the
alleged offense, if any, was committed on the 20th
day of July, but any date on or about that time is
sufficient if you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the offense charged was committed
under substantially the conditions detailed by the
witnesses for the State."

Defendant contended that the instruction deprived
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him of the right to have the jury pass on his alibi which
covered the date in question. The court said :
"It is proper to refuse, and error to give conflicting and contradictory instructions, since a
charge containing two distinct propositions conflicting with each other tends so to confuse the jury
as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent verdict, the jury cannot be required to determine what
part of a contradictory charge is correct or left
to reconcile conflicting principles of law; it ordinarily cannot be determined from the verdict which
rule was adopted by the jury, the court is left in
doubt and uncertainty as to the facts actually found
by the jury as a basis for its verdict, and where
instructions are inconsistent with, or contradict each
other, it is usually impossible to say whether the
jury was controlled by the one or the other."

With this rule we have no quarrel. The court in the
case cited then continued on to find whether the error in
the instruction constituted "reversible" error, and concluded in that case that it did because it was a measure cf
the quantum of proof necessary to the defendant's conviction. But the distinction between the case cited and the
case before this court is so manifest as to hardly need
more than comment. Any confusion in the instructions in
the instant case was resolved by the finding of the jury
that the plaintiff had no cause of action, and there has been
no error pointed out in any instruction by which the jury
was called upon to measure the evidence before it on that
point.
The second case cited by appellants, Sorensen v. Bell,
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51 Utah 262, 170 P. 72 we believe outlines the rule applicable to the situation in this case. In that case the instructions before the Supreme Court for review had to do with
a personal injury case. The particular instruction was determined to be erroneous and in conflict with another also
given which was correct but the court in considering whether or not reversal was necessary said,
"Where such is the case, and the evidence is conflicting upon the subject covered by the instructions, or is such that more than one conclusion is
permissible, and the record leaves it in doubt whether the jury followed the instruction that is proper
or the one that is improper, then but one result
is legally permissible in this court, and that is to
reverse the judgment and grant a new trial to the
aggrieved party. * * *" (Italics ours)
In the case at bar we direct this court's attention
again to the fact that the jury left no doubt as to its
action. There is no conflicting instruction on anything save
the measure of damages. The only claimed error in the
instruction on liability militated to the benefit of the appellants as we have hereinbefore set out and still the jury
found appellants had no cause of action. It is our position
that under the facts and the evidence as it stood before
the jury and as disclosed by the record on appeal there was
no other conclusion permissible than that arrived at by the
jury.
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POINT V.
THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

Appellants in their brief at point 5 claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict against the
plaintiffs of no cause of action and the verdict of the jury
in that regard is contrary to law. We find no argument
in the brief on this point and under the doctrine announced
in Felkner v. Smith, supra, we assume the appellants have
abandoned this point. The appellants do, however, argue
under their third heading that the verdict of the jury
on respondents' counterclaim is not supported by the evidence and is contrary to the law. The basis of the argument is that since the jury awarded the respondents only
$400.00 of a total amount claimed by respondents of $1,107.47 that the jury must have been confused by the court's
instructions and, therefore, there is reversible error. We
submit that this is not the fact. In the first place, the
appellants' argument amounts to a statement that the
respondents did not get enough damages. This argument
will not be entertained by an appellate court. 3 Am. J ur.
"Appeal and Error" at page 656, Section 1139 states,
"Whether or not defects and errors in the verdict or findings in an action necessitate or justify
reversal of the judgment or decree depends, just as
has been stated with respect to other errors, upon
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their effect upon the substantial rights or liabilities
of the parties. If the judgment or decree is either
not affected at all or is not affected in a way which
is prejudicial to the party complaining, the defect
or error may be disregarded by the reviewing
court."
The same authority states at Section 821, Page 362,
"An appeal brings up for review only that
which is decided adversely to the appellant. * * *"
It is unusual to find an appellant complaining that the
damages assessed against him are not sufficient and consequently one does not find authority in the case law determining on appeal the effect of a jury verdict against appellants where appellants claim the damages are less than
the amount respondents should have received. However,
one finds a vast amount of case law on the subject of excessive damages, and the rules there applied seem to be
applicable to the principle involved herein. That is,

"The damages assessed by the jury will not as
a general rule be disturbed on appeal on the ground
that it is excessive unless it is so excessive under
the particular circumstances of the case, as to demonstrate that the jury has acted against the rules
of law, or have suffered their passions, their prejudices, or their perverse disregard of the law to
mislead them. * * *" 3 Am. Jur. Appeal and Error,
Page 452, Section 893.
We are not confronted here with any such conduct by
the jury. Their action is entirely explainable by perfectly
logical views of the evidence which cannot be complained
of by the appellants. In the first place, the record makes
37
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manifest a conflict in the documentary and the verbal
testimony which was never at any time explained to the
jury and which by the acceptance of the documentary proof
as opposed to the verbal testimony would readily explain
the reduction in the damage award to respondents on their
counterclaim. In connection with the examination of Dr.
Schick, counsel for the respondents read to the jury and
ultimately introduced into evidence, a letter from Ashton,
Evans and Brazier, respondents, to Dr. Schick, which letter
was dated September 30, 1953. (R 600 Ex. 45. R 359)
Whereas, all of the verbal testimony of both Mr. Brazier
and Dr. Schick had referred to the architect's fee as 6%
of the construction cost, the document referred to states,
"In order to accommodate your financial situation (although according to our practice procedure
we should have billed you as of June 1, 1953) we
withheld billing for professional services rendered
in preparing documents until August 1, 1953, for
4% of the General Contract. As of this date no
payment has been made. We, therefore, are attaching hereto our statment as itemized for professional
services to date, requesting that payment be made."
(Italics ours)
The statement referred to in the letter was not submitted to the jury. Without explanation the letter appears
to set the architect's fee at 4% rather than 6% of the
general contract. Actually the fact, had it been proved,
was that this was a partial billing. However, no explanation was ever given to the jury. This was the only demand
for payment by respondents which was testified to or
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presented to the jury. Calculating the architects fee at
4% of the $34,000.00 plus which Mrs. Schick testified the

cost of the house to be (R 276) or applied to the $35,124.00 alleged in respondents' counterclaim (R 4, 582) as

the construction cost brings the architect's fee to almost
the exact figure of $1400.00 which the jury allowed. It must
be remembered that it had been testified that $1,000.00
of the fee had been paid, thus leaving the balance of $400.00
which the jury awarded to defendants on their counterclaim.
This theory brings the award well within the province
of the jury in determining the amount of damages and
the award is neither speculative, or a compromise. As we
first stated, it is not the appellants who should be heard
to complain if the respondents were not awarded all that
they should have received.
One further word should be said with regard to the
overall question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, both on the plaintiffs' complaint - no
cause of action, and on the defendants' counterclaim. More
than in the usual case, it should be remembered that the
jury is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses. It
is the jury that heard and saw the witnesses. It is the jury
that had the opportunity to formulate their views as to
the validity of the complaints by Dr. Schick, a man who
told the jury he couldn't read a blueprint, and didn't
understand about construction and diagrams of construction, ( R 372) but who wrote pages of detailed instruc-
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tions to the architects and demanded drawings and details
and pointed out flaws which he found in the drawings
submited to him and who couldn't be satisfied with the
ordinary in any phase of the construction. (R 600, ~x.'s
35, 42, 43, 47, 49) The same man who testified he had
never requested that space in the furnace room be used as
a dark room, (R 352) but who wrote a memorandum to
respondents stating he had details on a dark room from
Eastman and demanding a sketch of the proposed installation. (R 600, Ex. 43) The jury heard Mr. Hassell, the
engineer relied upon by appellants to prove the deficiency
of the heating system, when he had to admit that the statement of counsel as to the manner in which the fans used
in the furnace installed in the Schick residence derived
their load was correct, and yet refused to admit that his
written report to Dr. Schick was in error wherein it contained a statement as to how the fans derived their load
which was exactly contrary to the statement of counsel.
(R 201, 202) The jury heard the contractor relied upon
by the appellants, Mr. Pons, who knew all about everything, knew all about the heating system, and the insulation and the repairs necessary, and then had to admit
that he had never seen the plans for the construction of the
house as designed by respondents until the day before the
trial and had only looked at them then because he thought
he might be asked a question on them. ( R 250)

It is hardly necessary to remind this court that the
verdict of the jury should not be lightly disturbed. Appel40
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lants have not expressly argued their point 7, that the
court erred in overruling the motion for new trial. Again
referring to the principle announced in Felkner v. Smith,
supra, we assume that this has been abandoned as a separate ground upon which to base this appeal, but since the
principles there involved are so closely related and integrated with the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the verdict we have combined our position thereon and have presented the argument as one matter. We
believe that the trial court correctly denied the motion for
new trial. As we have elsewhere in our argument pointed
out, none of the errors complained of by appellants are
in any way prejudicial to the appellants. Considering the
evidence as a whole, and the record before this court, we
submit that no other reasonable conclusion could be reached other than that arrived at by the jury. The attempt
of the appellants to avoid the consequences of their own
refusal to abide by the plans as drawn by the architects,
and to blame the effects of their penuriousness on the
respondents instead of admitting that the changes they
themselves insisted upon were the cause of whatever distress they claimed to have suffered, real or imagined, was
so patent from the testimony elicited before the jury that it
is difficult to conceive how any other verdict could have
been derived.
We refer the court to the statement in 3 Am. Jur.
"Appeal and Error, Section 1111, Page 634,

"* * * When the undisputed evidence estab41
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lishes the correctness of the verdict, so that either
with or without the erroneous instruction the verdict could not have been otherwise than it was and,
had it been otherwise, it would have been set aside
by the court, or if the result is one that might
properly be directed by the court, technical errors
will be disregarded."
This court in the case of Krantz v. Rio Grande Western
Ry. Co., 12 Utah 104, 41 P. 717 announced a doctrine
which to this day remains the law of the state,
"We are of the opinion from this record that
the appellant is entitled to recover from the railroad company, and are not disposed and do not find
it necessary to put him to the expense and trouble
of a new trial. 'Why should a verdict be set aside
which is correct, because erroneous principles of
law have been announced by the court? The object
of a jury trial being to do justice between the parties the annulment of the verdict, where this has
been accomplished, on account of mistakes and misdirections on the part of the court, would seem akin
to the criticism which censured a celebrated commander because he persisted in winning victories in
violation of the rules of strategy.' Railroad Co. v.
Burke, 53 Miss. 227."
We submit that justice has been done between the
parties to this action and that the verdict should be sustained.
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CONCLUSION
The verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court
entered thereon, and the ruling of the court on appellants'
motion for new trial are correct and should be affirmed
with costs to the respondents.
Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN H. TIBBALS
BOYDEN, TIBBALS, STATEN & CROFT
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
351 South State, Suite #2
Salt Lake City, Utah
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